INTERCEPTOR ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS HISTORY

Soviet Antisatellite Weapon was characterized: “[as] … a co-orbital device; that is, it is launched into an orbit that inter sects the orbit of the targeted vehicle at the proper time and makes the kill before completing two revolutions.” [Lupton, D.E. 1998 On Space Warfare. Air University Press] The later constraint reflected technology limitations, where a weapon system would, “[stay] …  spaceborne in the course of its missions” [Dolfing, H. 2022 Satellite Bombs, Gliders, or ICBMs? Krafft Ehricke and Early Thinking on Long-Range Strategic Weapons. The Space Review (19 December)]. For instance, there is the ‘Satelloid’: a low-altitude satellite using engines with small thrust to maintain its orbit [Dolfing, 2022]. The Satelloid term was introduced in 1955 by Krafft Ehricke, “and designates a powered vehicle ... [and human piloted] ... half airplane, half spaceship — with sustained thrust that operates in circular orbits roughly between 100 to 200 kilometres” [Dolfing, 2022].

The Interceptor could also be a robotic satellite, essentially a weapon in its own right, containing conventional explosives, launched into the same orbit as the target satellite, moving near enough to destroy it [Grego, L. 2012 A History of Antisatellite Programs. Union of Concerned Scientists (January); Zak, A. 2013 The Hidden History of the Soviet Satellite-Killer. Popular Mechanics (1 November)]. A 1990s era declassified United Kingdom Government study describing the, “threat to a Geostationary communications satellite system”, by the Soviet Union’s Antisatellite Orbital Interceptor, from 1968 (till 1972), in terms of interceptions and destruction or disablement tests of non-manoeuvring target satellites in Low Earth Orbit, at 160-1,600 kilometres altitude; the craft, using either an electro-optical sensor or radar,

“begins to search for its target at a range of about 100 kilometres, usually acquiring it at 30-40 kilometres. The homing phase of the interception ends with the detonation of a high explosive warhead, which directs high velocity fragments at the target from a few hundred meters.” [United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. The Threat to Satellite Communications After 1990. Declassified Study D__TI/22/2/3/15].

Rendezvous technology would give rise to developing inspection and strike satellite-spacecraft which have come to dominate current Orbital Warfare concepts. This is also where robotic satellite-spacecraft with appendages (robotic arms) can operate in stable long-duration orbits ‘working’ the Satellite Layer.

UNITED STATES F-15/MINIATURE HOMING VEHICLE INTERCEPTOR

The orbital component distinguishes Co-Orbital Antisatellite Weapons use from direct Ground to Space attacks relying on Direct Ascent Antisatellite Weapons, like the U.S. ASM-135 air-launched antisatellite multistage missile carried exclusively by F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft, demonstrated in 1985.

► U.S. Antisatellite missile launch on 13 September 1985. Taken at the Pacific Missile Test Range in California. Paul E. Reynolds (USAF).

►► In 1987, the Pentagon predicted that it cost upward of $5 billion to deploy it, leading to its termination [Grier, P. 2009 The Flying Tomato Can. Air and Space Forces Magazine (1 February)].

Following the first successful test of the Miniature Homing Vehicle fired from an F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft in January 1984, it was planned by 1994 to have 112 available for firing from 40 specially modified F15s [Ministry of Defence [United Kingdom] Circa 1980s. Specifies How Many Antisatellite Weapons the United States Planned to Deploy. Declassified Report Paragraphs 20-21] It was, “predicted only some 46 key Soviet targets, all in Low Orbit … [were targetable]” [Ministry of Defence, 1980s]. The Miniature Homing Vehicle was described as having a maximum altitude of 700 kilometres above the Earth’s surface, and:

‘[is a] … 30 centimetres, 16 kilograms device which tracks the target’s Infrared Radiation emanations with its own sensors. Its on board computer guides it to collide and destroy its target by kinetic energy. It attains its very high closing speed both by its own rocket motors and use of a Short Range Attack Missile as a booster.’ [Ministry of Defence, 1980s]

A 1987 United Nations study described the missile components consisting of a first stage embodying the motor of the tactical Short-Range Attack Missile and a second stage involving an Altair III motor [Lellouche, P. 1987 Satellite Warfare: A Challenge for the International Community. UNIDIR (15 December)]. It was stated the Miniature Homing Vehicle: “lashes the objective and destroys it by simple impact at a speed of approximately 13 kilometres per second.” [Lellouche, 1987]

SOVIET C0-ORBITAL INTERCEPTION SYSTEM

In 1963, the Soviet first prototype ‘Satellite-Killer’ was designated Polyot-1: Flight-1, it was a highly manoeuvrable spacecraft intended to, “approach an ‘enemy’ satellite and blow it into smithereens.” [Zak, 2013] However, Soviet Orbital Approach Technology had limitations:

“in 1963, the Soviets began developing a co-orbital Antisatellite system capable of destroying satellites in Low Earth Orbit. The system had to be launched into the same orbital plane as the target satellite before gradually manoeuvring close to its target and detonating a conventional warhead - a process that could take hours.” [Harrison, T. Cooper, Z. Johnson, K. Roberts, T. 2017 The Evolution of Space as a Contested Domain. Space News (9 October)]

Orbital approach technology gave rise in the 1960s to a Co-Orbital Strategy contemplated by Soviet military thinkers where the target satellite’s orbital plane passed over an Interceptor Launch Site, the Interceptor could be launched into the same plane [Grego, 2012]. Since Low Earth-Orbiting satellites only pass over a given launch site twice a day, the average wait time for an opportunity to launch an attack was expected to be 6 hours. The 1,400 kilogram Russian Co-Orbital Antisatellite Weapon was a remotely controlled robotic spacecraft designed to approach a satellite, guided by controllers on the ground, within one or two orbits (1.5 to 3 hours). An onboard radar system guided the Interceptor to within tens of meters of the target, to detonate an explosive damaging it with shrapnel propelled by the explosion [Grego, 2012]. A 1987 United Nations study, described the Soviet Co-Orbital Interception System,

“as a rule makes two orbitings before undertaking the interception manoeuvre. In order for this to be done, the orbits of the interceptor and the target must be virtually coplanar (in general they are almost touching, the orbit of the ‘killer’ being slightly lower). In the terminal phase, the warhead of the interceptor, guided to the objective by an active radar beam” [Lellouche, 1987]

It has been suggested that shrapnel released by the explosion had an effective range of 50 meters [Martin, M. Pfrang, K. Weeden, B. 2021 Russian Co-Orbital Antisatellite Testing. Secure World Foundation (April)]. While a 1987 United Nations study, suggested the exploding craft projected, “a multitude of small metal pellets similar to buckshot … the distance between the interceptor and the target would appear to be 1 to 9 kilometres.” [Lellouche, 1987]

Soviet orbit tests suggested the, “shrapnel ejected by the ‘killer’ satellite … [moved] … at a relative speed of 1.2 - 2.1 kilometres per second.” [Zak, A. 2017 IS [Istrebitel Sputnikov] Antisatellite System. Russian Space Web]

The 1960 Istrebitel Sputnikov: Satellite Destroyer, as an Interceptor launched into orbit would separate from its booster, making multiple orbit changes, allowing it to pass close to a target [Zak, 2017]. The barrel-shaped spacecraft had 17 thrusters to make any conceivable maneuverer in orbit. Supported by a complex network of Ground Stations spread over time zones across the Soviet Union for tracking enemy satellites and guiding the Satellite-Killer to its target [Zak, 2013].

By 1978, a converted R-36 ICBM topped with the Istrebitel Sputnikov: Satellite Destroyer could be rolled out to the launchpad from its bunker in Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, propped into vertical position, loaded with propellants, and blasted-off towards its target in just an hour and a half [Zak, 2013]. Between 1983 and 1991 Soviet IS-MU was capable of chasing enemy satellites even if they tried avoidance manoeuvres [Zak, 2013]. In the 2000s, the Russian military relied on converted ballistic missiles placed in well-protected silos and equipped with manoeuvrable satellites capable of sending missiles on a collision course with enemy satellites at a minute’s notice [Zak, 2013].

Russia’s Naryad-V (military designation 14F11), consists of an orbital space tug, with an engine that can fire up to 75 times during one mission [Zak, 2013]. A highly manoeuvrable rocket stage serves as a launch platform for multiple missiles. Each missile initially receives guidance from its orbital launch platform and homes-in on its target using powerful thrusters facing four directions. The missile’s warhead locks onto its target, and its minicomputer takes over flight control.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE’S PROGRAM 437AP SATELLITE INSPECTOR

Made public by President Johnson in 1964 (but only declassified in 1991), Program 437AP satellite inspector was an alternate payload of the mid-1960s Program 437 Direct Ascent Antisatellite Weapon System. This employed a Thor Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile, that had carried a nuclear warhead within its blunt-nosed General Electric Mark II re-entry vehicle. Designed to fly a sub-orbital trajectory to intercept and destroy Soviet satellites that passed within range of its launch site on Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean. The satellite inspector was conceptually similar, but only took photos of its target [Austerman, W.R. 1991 Program 437: The Air Force’s First Antisatellite System. Air Force Space Command; Chun, C.K.S. 2000 Shooting Down a “Star” Program 437, the US Nuclear ASAT System and Present-Day Copycat Killers. Air Force Academy Institute of National Security Studies. CADRE Paper Number 6. Air University Press (April); Molczan, T. 2016 Program 437AP: A Sub-orbital Corona-Derived Satellite Inspector. SATOBS (6 January)].

HUMAN SATELLITE INSPECTORS (1960s): Minutes for a 1964 meeting with Sir Arthur Tange (Australian Government), Congress persons Miller and Casey (United States Government), stated: “techniques involved in Project Gemini, when fully developed, would be fundamental in intercepting and even boarding foreign satellites, should this be necessary.” [United States - Australian Government Meeting Minutes Extract (1964)] In response to the 15 December, 1965 Gemini VI and VII first rendezvous in Space:

“Dr. Edward C. Welsh, Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council … told reporters that the accomplishment would lead to: (1) operation of manned Space Stations with crews replaced and supplies renewed by rendezvous methods; (2) assembly of large observatories and spacecraft hundreds of miles above Earth; (3) ability to inspect foreign spacecraft; and (4) techniques for visiting and rescuing Astronauts stalled in orbit.” [Scientific and Technical Information Branch, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1966 Astronautics and Aeronautics. Issue 4006]

For several years prior to 1962, the United States Air Force pursued development plans, “[for] … demonstration of … [a] … satellite inspection concept.” [Berger, C. 1966 The Air Force in Space Fiscal Year 1962. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office (June)] This investigation also involved pursuing, “boosters required to orbit … [a] … satellite vehicle.” [Berger, 1966]

► Soviets around 1984, developed a Laser Pistol that used a lamp-cartridge loaded pyrotechnic flash, with a blinding force up to a range of 20 meters: 65 feet [Zak, A. 2018 The Soviet Laser Space Pistol, Revealed. Popular Mechanics (14 June)]. It is generally understood this was designed for close-in combat on a Space Station. The Laser Pistol was intended to ‘flash blind’ an opponent in close-in fighting, such as during a hostile Spacecraft boarding action. The 1984 Soviet Laser Pistol reflected scenarios, “[that led] … Some Russian sources … [to] … characterized the Laser Pistol as an individual self-defence weapon for Cosmonauts in orbit, making an impression that the Soviet Space crews were preparing for shootouts with their enemies inside the Space Station … [it imagines a] … scenario in which American ‘Space Troopers’ would be able to rendezvous, dock, and break into the pressurized compartment of a Soviet Orbital Facility … the worry prompted … [inventing] … various defences, including the … Laser Pistol … promised to be smaller and lighter than an outright Space cannon … the goal was to make the Laser Pistol as small and light as a normal handgun … Russian sources do not elaborate whether Cosmonauts could use the weapon on a Spacewalk outside the Station. Presumably, they could fire … at the enemy Spacecraft through the window, while staying safely in the pressurized compartment.” [Zak, 2018]

►► It should be noted the 1975 arming of Soviet Salyut-3: OPS-2 (Almaz-2), with a specially adapted R-23M Kartech, was intended to defend against American Astronaut attacks.

KEY POINTS ABOUT ORBITAL WARFARE

Co-Orbital Antisatellite System, Co-Orbital Technology, Tactics and Strategy.