ORBITAL WARFARE CONCEPTS

In Orbital Warfare, “there is a trade-off between how far an orbital asset could travel and how fast it could get there … a satellite may travel a long distance slowly without expending all its fuel, or it may travel a short distance very rapidly with a greater expenditure.” [Drew, J.V. 2020 Space Operations: Lines, Zones, Options, and Dilemmas. Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 99. 4th Quarter] Alternatively, the ‘In-Space’ Zone of Operation [Drew, 2020], can be conceived in terms of area effect, using a weapon not aimed at any particular satellite, as a target, used instead to effect a number. For instance, “the Starfish Prime test of 1962 injected long-lived trapped energetic electrons into Earth’s magnetic fields, causing the early demise of several satellites.” [Conrad, E.E. et al. 2010 Collateral Damage to Satellites from and EMP Attack. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (August)] In that event, there was a high altitude nuclear detonation that was not specifically targeting space assets, but effected the Space Environment; this is where, “high levels of radiation, highly energetic particles and fluctuating magnetic fields can severely impact space capabilities.” [Ministry of Defence [United Kingdom]. 2022 Joint Doctrine Publication 0-40, UK Space Power. Ministry of Defence] Historically, the effect of the detonated Starfish Prime nuclear warhead, was:

“radiation effects lingered in the Earth’s magnetic fields and affected satellites that followed an orbital path through the detonation area. Electronic components were destroyed and continued exposure to radiation trapped in the Earth’s magnetic fields degraded the life of affected satellites.” [Chun, C.K.S. 2000 Shooting Down a “Star” Program 437, the US Nuclear ASAT System and Present-Day Copycat Killers. Air Force Academy Institute of National Security Studies. CADRE Paper Number 6. Air University Press (April)]

NUCLEAR SPACE MINE

“Some experts disagree that the Space Mine is an actual threat. Their argument is that mines need accurate positioning information to target Geosynchronous satellites, information which is not yet available. A recent unpublished study by the General Research Corporation, however, shows mines not only are a credible threat but that a Soviet SL-12 launch vehicle has the capability to place two 1150 kilograms (380 kilograms warhead, 450 kilograms electronics, 160 kilograms propulsion, and 160 kilograms structure) mines in Geosynchronous Orbit, each with the capability of destroying any non-manoeuvrable Geosynchronous target.” [Giffen, R.B. 1982 US Space System Survivability: Strategic Alternatives for the 1990s. National Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-4. National Defense University Press]

“Manoeuvre capability does little to counter the threat of Space Mines targeted against Geosynchronous satellites, since the mines would be co-located with the targets, and little, if any, warning time would be available to manoeuvre out of range. The best defence against a Space Mine is to avoid using Geosynchronous Orbits for satellites performing wartime missions. This defence is quite drastic because the unique advantages of Geosynchronous Orbits would be sacrificed.” [Giffen, 1982]

“Although mines placed in orbits other than Geosynchronous would still be a threat, any such action would immediately telegraph enemy intentions because a Geosynchronous Orbit has only one orbital plane, with an exact altitude of 35,800 kilometres. Placing a payload next to another satellite in this orbit can be easily justified based on mission requirements alone. Doing the same thing in a Molniya Orbit, however, can’t be justified because an infinite number of other orbits would satisfy the same mission requirements.” [Giffen, 1982]

The Nuclear Space Mine is primarily an Orbital Area Effect Weapon:

“High-Altitude Nuclear Detonation. Countries possessing nuclear weapons and long range missiles have the inherent capability to detonate a nuclear warhead in space, potentially affecting all three segments of a space system. Such an attack could have wide-reaching effects on all nations’ abilities to operate in the domain. Countries less reliant on space support for their military applications may have an advantage over the United States following a nuclear detonation in Space.” [Space Training and Readiness Command. 2023 Space Doctrine Publication 3-100, Space Domain Awareness (2 November)]

The notion of an Orbital Area Effect Weapon – a weapon changing the Space Environment, making it a harsher place for satellite survival, such as: “once-fictional notion of using Nuclear Space Weapons to incapacitate satellites with powerful energy waves is now a tangible reality.” [Rozpedowski, J. 2024 Every War is a Space War Now. Geopolitical Monitor (March 12)] The Soviet Polyus spacecraft had provision for a, “mine launcher.” [Wade, M. 2019 Polyus Combat Satellite. Cutaway Drawing of the Polyus 1 Space Weapons Platform. Astronautix] It was designed to bus a load of Nuclear Space Mines, launching these from orbit. The Polyus launcher, “would have been capable of delivering Nuclear warheads from orbit to any point in the … [United States] ... in six minutes.” [Grondine, E. 2019 Polyus. Astronautix] Which implies each Nuclear Mine-Warhead was encased in a re-entry vehicle. However, rather than used as an orbital bombarder, it is also known during the Cold War Soviets had Nuclear Space Mines on the drawing board as a possible Antisatellite Weapon [Hendrickx, B. 2016 Naryad-V and the Soviet Antisatellite Fleet. Space Chronicle. Volume 69; Martin, M. Pfrang, K. Weeden, B. 2021 Russian Co-Orbital Antisatellite Testing. Secure World Foundation (April)]. Called Kamin: Fireplace: Space mines, this was a 1985 concept for a constellation of small interceptors deployed in orbits close to potential target satellites, several were intended to be bused into orbit by a launch vehicle [Hendrickx, 2016]. Orbiting craft like the Kamin-N (Low Earth Orbit variety) Space Mines could have circled the Earth close to their targets.

As a final note, the presence of Space Mines close to Global Positioning System satellites, and possibility of a Space Mine attack is still identified as a plausible Space security scenario [Harrison, T. Johnson, K. Young, M. 2021 Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space: Protecting Space Systems from Counterspace Weapons. A Report of the CSIS Aerospace Security Project. Rowman & Littlefield (February)]. This is because: “nuclear detonations in Space increase the radiation exposure of other satellites and can significantly shorten their lifespan.” [Harrison, 2021] In 2021, it was publicly stated France’s new Syracuse 4A Satellite, ‘was to be protected against an event like an electromagnetic pulse resulting from a nuclear explosion’ [Agence France-Presse. 2021 France Launches State-of-Art Military Communications Satellite. Economic Times (24 October); Agence France-Presse. 2021 France Successfully Launches Cutting-Edge Military Communications Satellite. France24 (23-24 October)]. Defence against a potential electromagnetic pulse can be achieved through, “electromagnetic shielding … [that] … hardens satellites against high-powered microwave and electromagnetic pulse weapons.” [Harrison, 2021] The French Space Defence Strategy also identifies a high-altitude nuclear explosion using a weapon like a Space Mine, as one of several future potential threats from Earth [Space Working Group [Report of the]. 2019 Space Defence Strategy. French Ministry For Armed Forces (November)].

SPACE MINE CONCEALMENT

Notion of a pre-placed Space Mine which has had its true nature concealed when it was launched remains the greatest threat and strategic shock. While terrestrial concealment, or camouflaging techniques are not directly applied in Orbital Warfare, to hide a satellite, there is nevertheless:

“2.8. Characterisation. While space objects can be detected, tracked and identified, in the current complex and congested Space Environment where adversaries attempt to hide the true nature of their activities, an equally important challenge is to characterise space objects to understand their true purpose.” [Ministry of Defence, 2022]

In the 2014 case of Object 2014-28E, it was originally catalogued as Space debris from a Russian satellite launch, and was observed, “flying close to the spent stages, manoeuvring to get closer.” [Pappalardo, J. 2018 Space Junk Could Provide a Perfect Hiding Spot for Tiny Spy Satellites. Popular Mechanics (30 November)] It has been speculated: “It’s not hard to make it look like space debris from the upper stage” [Pappalardo, 2018]. Use of,

“Space debris, which appear via radar cross-section to be orbital refuse, such as spent final rocket stages or parts of destroyed spacecraft could also have surreptitious underpinnings. Drifting and or tumbling just enough in an orbital trajectory to be convincing.” [Rowlands, G. 2019 Astrosubterfuge: Deception & Disguise in the Space Domain. Australian Army Research Centre (16 July)]

Another example of concealment in orbit, was markings seen on the Soviet Polyus spacecraft. It was finished in black with white lettering on its side in Cyrillic script bearing the name: ПОЛЮС, and designation NMP-2 (apparently using European script), which is understood to be a reference to the Mir-2 Space Station. This attempt at subterfuge was like, “the Almaz project … disguised as a civilian Salyut series.” [Zak, A. 2021 Salyut-3 (Almaz OPS-2) Space Station. Russian Space Web]

In 2018, a Chinese military satellite called Tongxin Jishu Shiyan-3 used its apogee kick motor (the upper stage of the rocket) which retained enough fuel to enter Geosynchronous Orbit conducting a series of Rendezvous and Proximity Operations, ‘between the satellite and its motor’ [Clark, C. 2021 US, China, Russia Test New Space War Tactics: Sats Buzzing, Spoofing, Spying. Breaking Defense (28 October]. One of the manoeuvres involved - a decoy manoeuvre - a type of concealment, with one craft behind the other in relation to Earth-based observations:

“Tongxin Jishu Shiyan-3 thrusted away from its original position, taking advantage of the daytime terminator phase (the period when ground-based telescopes are most likely to lose track of it). Its motor had maneuvered next to the … satellite so that any observer who reacquired it would see the booster sitting where the satellite was; in effect, a decoy manoeuvre. This … [allowed] … a few days of unmonitored activity, where it might be able to get a jump on any target satellite it was heading towards. This became a pattern, and possibly standard operating procedure, when Shijian-21 performed a similar feint and scoot using its apogee kick motor shortly after it arrived in orbit in 2021.” [Chen, D.D. Singer, P.W. 2024 Fast Movers: Chinese Satellites Zoom Around for Inspections  or Interference. Defense One (20 May)]

KEY POINTS ABOUT ORBITAL WARFARE

In-Space Zone of Operation, Space Environment, Concealment.