SPACE-LINK-GROUND/USER SEGMENTS AND SPACE DOMAIN/SITUATIONAL AWARENESS COMPONENT MODEL

The 1963 Russian Co-Orbital Antisatellite Weapon was a remotely controlled robotic spacecraft designed to approach a satellite, guided by controllers on the ground [Grego, L. 2012 A History of Antisatellite Programs. Union of Concerned Scientists (January)]. A major assumption about the conduct of Orbital Warfare, it will continue with, “spatial separation of Human combatants from their weaponry.” [Ramey, R.A. 2000 Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: the Law of War in Space. The Air Force Law Review. Volume 48] Another Fundamental, is the overall structure of Orbital Warfare - Space operations, is composed of three Segments (or Elements):

“comprised of three principal Segments: Orbital, Link, and Ground. The Orbital Segment includes assets in Space, the Link Segment covers the electromagnetic spectrum used to communicate with and between satellites, and the Ground Segment includes the terrestrial infrastructure used to control and communicate with satellites.” [Suss, J. 2024 Asymmetric Warfare in Space: Five Proposals from Chinese Strategic Thought. Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower. Volume 3. Number 1 (Spring)]

Even though, Orbital Warfare - Space operations is definable by it being an on-orbit (Space to Space, in-Space) warfighting capability/activity, it is nevertheless tethered to its Link and Ground (which can also be split into mobile User) Segments in the Space Power Triad: Space-Link-Ground Segments [United States Space Force [Headquarters]. 2020 Space Capstone Publication, Spacepower (June); Defence Space Command (2022). The “Lightspeed” Space Power eManual. Air and Space Power Centre]. Added to which there is the Space Domain/Situational Awareness component▼.

► Space-Link-Ground/User Segments and Space Domain/Situational Awareness Component Model showing a GPS satellite (in a higher orbit), under potential attack from a Red satellite (passing underneath in a lower orbit) directed from the Opponent’s Ground Control, and a Blue defender satellite Orbital Manoeuvring to defend (in a lower orbit) directed by its own Ground Control using fixed, and mobile elements. Various Users dependent on GPS could be blocked by the Red attack. In terms of tracking a satellite’s observable signatures:

“A satellite in orbit around the Earth creates a number of potentially observable signatures. Since most satellites are partly composed of Radio Frequency-reflective materials, (e.g. metals), the technique most used to detect and track most satellites in Low Earth Orbit is active radar.” [Eves, S. 2019 Space Situational Awareness Warfare. Freeman Air and Space Institute. Paper 6 (July)]

▲▲ In terms of tracking a satellite’s observable signatures in Low Earth Orbit as it passes-over in twilight conditions it can be tracked optically, as the target object is illuminated by the Sun using both passive optical telescopes and laser rangefinders. In Medium Earth Orbits and Geostationary Earth Orbits the majority of the tracking is performed by optical telescopes since the altitudes are too great for effective radar tracking [Eves, 2019].

▲▲▲ It is generally viewed, a Co-Orbital Antisatellite Weapon attack would require fairly precise tracking - a capability available only to highly sophisticated militaries [Federation of American Scientists. 2004 United States Space Systems: Vulnerabilities and Threats. Ensuring America’s Space Security (August)]. However, it should be noted that a low-tech scenario for satellite tracking was demonstrated in the 1950s, in the United States:

“[proving] … this required only a minimal technology approach: amateur satellite observers used stopwatches, sky maps, personal computers and sometimes binoculars to determine satellites’ orbital elements. Hence, tracking can be done using common and inexpensive electronics with minimal training. This is in line with U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph’s concern about non-governmental satellite observers tracking satellites and posting their orbits on the internet, which can possibly … [be] … used by terrorist organizations.” [Remuss, N-L. 2009 The Need to Counter Space Terrorism – A European Perspective. ESPI Perspectives. Number 17 (January)]

▲▲▲▲ In September 2023, the United States Space Force launched its Silentbarker - a Space Domain Awareness Satellite. There is also a 2017 class of satellite operating in Geosynchronous Orbit that has clear, unobstructed and distinct vantage point for viewing resident space objects without the interruption of weather or the atmospheric distortion that can limit ground-based systems [United States Space Force. 2020 Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program. Fact Sheet (October)].

GROUND CONTROL COMPONENT

The Space Component: a satellite, and its Ground Control/Controller has a Data Line of Communication (the Link Segment), “[that] provide the electromagnetic connection between the ground station controlling the in-Space action” [Drew, J.V. 2020 Space Operations: Lines, Zones, Options, and Dilemmas. Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 99. 4th Quarter]. Both the United States and China have developed Ground Segment units that potentially have an on-orbit warfighting capability. The United States Space Force’s Space Delta 9 unit is responsible for conducting orbital warfare [Decker, A 2023 How the ‘Stormbringers’ are Preparing for War in Space. Defence One (27 June)].

► United States Space Force’s Space Delta 9 badge.

►► The Delta 9 unit represents: “United States Space Force in-domain maneuver and fires element … Space Delta 9 is at the forefront as new forces are developed and integrated to conduct orbital warfare operations in the Space Domain.” [Air Command and Staff College. 2023 AU-18 Space Primer. Air University Press]

►►► The Delta 9 unit is responsible for the following: “Mission: [P]repare, present, and project assigned and attached forces for the purpose of conducting protect and defend operations and providing national decision authorities with response options to deter and, when necessary, defeat orbital threats … This includes operating the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) system, Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), and X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle.” [Bingen, K.A. et al. 2022 U.S. Space Force Primer. CSIS Aerospace Security Project (22 December)]

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY UNIT 32032: China has its People’s Liberation Army Unit 32032, that centralizes on-orbit systems capable of Rendezvous and Proximity Operations including those for on-orbit servicing, in order to ensure resiliency of their Space-Based systems in wartime, and developing an on-orbit warfighting capability [Burke, K. 2023 PLA Counterspace Command and Control. China Aerospace Studies Institute (December); Burke, K. 2024 PLA On-Orbit Satellite Logistics. China Aerospace Studies Institute (March)]. In the case of the People’s Liberation Army’s Command and Control for their Space-Based Grappling Counterspace Weapons, it is suggested beginning in 2014, while the preference was for there to be centralized decision-making, in some battle scenarios, as technology may not yet be advanced enough to enable fast centralized decision-making, lower-level commanders could decide when to manoeuvre a satellite when a threat was known [Burke, 2023]. By mid-2021, Chinese military literature on Command and Control in regards, “[to  use of a] … satellite grappling weapon against an adversary space system, this would be highly escalatory … it is, however, safe to assume that such a decision in the People’s Liberation Army would be centralized.” [Burke, 2023]

SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

The United Kingdom’s Keystone Space Domain Doctrine, identifies that part of Space Domain Awareness, is:

“2.2. Space Surveillance and Tracking. Space Surveillance and Tracking is defined as: the detection, tracking and identification of objects in or entering the Space Domain, using data from sensor observations and satellite operators, sufficient to deliver effective Space Situational Awareness, Space Domain Awareness and Missile Warning.

Note: Space Surveillance and Tracking is delivered for both civil and military purposes. Space Surveillance and Tracking includes sensor tasking and management, orbit determination and propagation, catalogue maintenance, launch and manoeuvre detection amongst other tasks.” [Ministry of Defence [United Kingdom]. 2022 Joint Doctrine Publication 0-40, UK Space Power. Ministry of Defence]

The relationship between Co-Orbital Antisatellite Weapons and Space Domain Awareness comes under the mantle of, “Space Battle Management … [in terms of] … understanding the orbital position of resident space objects … [and] … provide military options and direction” [Space Training and Readiness Command. 2023 Space Doctrine Publication 3-100, Space Domain Awareness (2 November)]. The further extension of this link, is that in terms of Space Situational Awareness, this would be required when tracking-targeting non-cooperative satellites [Burke, 2023].

Space Situation Awareness Warfare: “Over the next decade, it is anticipated that technologies will be developed which will have the specific aim of complicating the task of a space aggressor by limiting the Space Situation Awareness information on which any attack would be based.” [Eves, 2019] A key relationship between Space Situation Awareness and Orbital Manoeuvre is:

“It does not matter how plentiful or how brilliant your adversary space weapon systems are if they cannot find or reach your critical space systems. If you are constantly manoeuvring so that he cannot find you, or your satellites are in hard to reach orbits, or have low observables, or you possess many believable satellite decoys, then he can never dominate you.” [Szymanski, P.S. 2019 How to Fight and Win the Coming Space War. Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall)]

There are a number of Orbital Manoeuvre options in Space Situation Awareness Warfare, all of which require manoeuvrable satellites, and will likely have high propellant costs:

(1) Randomised, Unexpected Manoeuvres: This is where a satellite undertakes randomised or unexpected manoeuvres which do not correlate with typical station keeping. It would likely appear as an uncorrelated object compelling an opponent to devote additional tracking resources to regain custody, as well as, “continuously generate uncertainties in its position, making it harder to target.” [Eves, 2019]

(2) Simulated Deorbiting Manoeuvre: If a satellite was to make a series of orbit lowering adjustments, simulating a retirement, then boost the mission to a higher orbit, when failing to appear in the expected location according to the opponent’s tracking, it might mistakenly assume that it had re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere [Eves, 2019]. A similar manoeuvre (that has an electronic component to it), to create temporary confusion for opponent tracking,

“would be to fake the demise of a satellite. Switching off transmitters and allowing the satellite to tumble might lead an adversary to conclude that the mission no longer constituted a threat. If it were then to be returned to service, this might catch an adversary unawares.” [Eves, 2019]

(3) Exploitation of a Decoy Object: “This could … present an aggressor with a challenge to distinguish the two objects as separate space objects, and might lead to uncertainties about which one constitutes the real target.” [Eves, 2019] There is an example of Orbital Manoeuvre Hide and Seek Tactic where one spacecraft is used for a decoy manoeuvre as a type of concealment. A possible variation might be,

“to command the satellite from a recent launch to rendezvous with a rocket body from a previous mission … [and] … slight differences in the eccentricity values of the two objects would cause them to appear to ‘rotate’ around one another over the course of an orbit, and if the phasing of this rotation cycle was adjusted carefully, could place the target satellite ‘behind’ its partner on those sections of its orbit when it might be tracked by a hostile power.” [Eves, 2019]

This type of manoeuvre could exploit the fact, “some rocket bodies are very large indeed and might obscure the new satellite from ground-based tracking sites almost completely.” [Eves, 2019]

(4) Rendezvous with an Allied or Third-Party Satellite: The Orbital Manoeuvre tactic is a long-range Proximity Operation. Manoeuvres of the two objects could be coordinated, or the rendezvous partner (third-party satellite), described as a, “companion satellite”, could be non-cooperative [Eves, 2019]. The object being to make it harder for an opponent’s tracking to differentiate the two objects [Eves, 2019]. The opponent satellite’s option is undertake an evasion to increase the separation between the satellites, such as in an Orbital Chase scenario.

(5) Synchronising Manoeuvres by Many Satellites Simultaneously: This is where  significant numbers of uncorrelated targets are created, or conduct a surge launch campaign, in a short period of time, involving multiple satellites on each launch vehicle that would temporarily confuse, or overwhelm opponent tracking [Eves, 2019]. Exploitation of Space Weather, could increase the deception, such as the activity conducted at the time of a major solar event. Solar eruptions are known to modify the Earth’s atmosphere to a significant degree, causing tracking to loose target satellites. As well, high solar activity times cause variations in the ionosphere that degrade accuracy of radar measurements.

▲ A key Orbital Manoeuvre tactic in regards to Space Situation Awareness Warfare is to blur anticipated and real paths of a space object from the view of Earth-based observation, by exploiting tracking blind spots. Tracking blind spot exploitation tends to be more problematic:

“[in] … Geosynchronous Orbit … [where this area] … are at most significant hazard from Co-Orbital Antisatellite Weapons … As Geosynchronous Orbit spacecraft effectively orbit at the same orbital plane and altitude, an Antisatellite spacecraft within the Geosynchronous Orbit could select between many targets and engage with limited warning. This lack of predictability is complicated by investment in micro-satellite architectures and the inherent difficulties of observation at a distance of 36,000 kilometres … co-orbital Antisatellite Weapons can present a wider variety of effects through controlled rendezvous, from reversible electronic jamming or forced repositioning (hijacking), to non-reversible directed energy attacks or contamination of sensors or solar arrays through chemical spraying.” [Limoge, J.P. 2024 How to Win(g) a War in Space: Enabling Rapid Surge Space Capabilities. Graduate Research Report. Air Command and Staff College Air University (February)]

The tactical objective is to confuse the opponent’s Space Surveillance and Tracking, by using randomised, unexpected manoeuvres, decoys, or other satellites to conceal an approach against an opponent satellite, as a surprise move.

Dynamic Space Operations Challenge (see Dynamic Orbital Manoeuvre Revolution): the concept of Dynamic Space Operations (an alternative paradigm proposed to Positional Space Operations: Quasi-Positional Siting Theory), is argued:

“will also change the nature of foundational space capabilities such as Space Domain Awareness. Positional Space Operations of the past have led to the assumption that an accurate picture of the Space Domain can be maintained by keeping track of each object’s Keplerian orbit parking spot. If these parking spots are constantly changing due to Dynamic Space Operations, maintaining a catalogue of previously observed orbital parameters for satellites is no longer adequate to address the emerging dynamic nature of Space.” [Shaw, J.E. Bourque, D.R. Shaw, M. 2023 Dynamic Space Operations: The New Sustained Space Maneuver Imperative. Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower. Volume 2. Special Edition (Winter)]

SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS SATELLITE