A 1971 memorandum from the National Reconnaissance Office [United States Government] detailing policy on satellite manoeuvre in the case of a potential satellite interception, states:

“In peacetime the instruction to the … [Director - National Reconnaissance Office] … is to permit Russia to shoot down one of our satellites. We then consider what our next action should be. In time of crisis, if the satellite collection is sufficiently important, the DNRO may be instructed by the Secretary of Defense or higher authority to make a manoeuvre” [Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee. 1971 Meeting Minutes of 14 June (17 June)].

The strategic attitude was an acknowledgment of the fact the United States would probably lose the first intercepted satellite [Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee, 1971]. Later, in the case of the 1991 Persian Gulf War: “Assets in Space were reallocated to support communications requirements.” [Bruger, S.J. 1995 Not Ready for the First Space War: What About the Second? Naval War College Review. Volume 48. Number 1] A Defense Satellite Communications System satellite was moved from its Geosynchronous Pacific Ocean Orbit to the Indian Ocean, where it supplemented two other DSCS communications satellites - one already over the Indian Ocean and one above the Atlantic Ocean.” [Bruger, 1995] This was because,

“In August 1991 the United States only had two Super High Frequency communications satellites in Geosynchronous Orbit over the region - one Defense Satellite Communications System II and one DSCS III satellite … anticipating this would not be sufficient for future operations, Air Force Space Command … repositioned a reserve DSCS II satellite from the Pacific theater.” [Ward, R.S. 1993 The Need for an Antisatellite Capability in the Twenty-First Century. Air War College Air University (April)]

DYNAMIC SPACE OPERATIONS

A space war concept is – “space mobility … [which] … refers to the ability of high speed and manoeuvrable spacecraft to operate at high altitudes in a boundless environment that is not subject to the limitations of territorial boundaries, weather or the time of day.” [Pollpeter, K. 2005 The Chinese Vision of Space Military Operations. Mulvenon, J. Finkelstein, D.M. Editors. China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs. Alexandria, Virginia: The CNA Corporation] However, “[while] … spacecraft do travel very fast, they are, in fact, quite limited in their ability to manoeuvre.” [Pollpeter, 2005] A 2024 comment by the Chief of Space Operations - General B. Chance Saltzman, concerning sustained space manoeuvre - Dynamic Space Operations, described, “almost continuous manoeuvring, so that the satellite from any one radar shot looks like it’s manoeuvring and it’s just kind of constantly changing its orbit as it goes through — preserving mission but changing its orbit.” [Hadley, G. 2024 Fast & Flexible Space. Air and Space Forces Magazine (26 January)] Fundamentally, sustained space manoeuvre - Dynamic Space Operations, is about the deployment of a force of long-term (with the promise of greater in-space logistics and delivery refuelling) highly manoeuvrable spacecraft-satellites that can overwhelm and confuse the opponent’s Space Situational Awareness/Space Domain Awareness technology.

In Dynamic Space Operations the objective is to shift the space operations paradigm to one, “where spaceborne combat forces are no longer static and predictable.” [Shaw, J.E. Bourque, D.R. Shaw, M. 2023 Dynamic Space Operations: The New Sustained Space Maneuver Imperative. Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower. Volume 2. Special Edition (Winter)] This is possible if the satellite force have craft with, “ability to sustain space manoeuvre — particularly in the face of an adversary.” [Shaw, 2023] To achieve sustain space manoeuvre, there was a recent call for, “government … [to] … incentivize satellite developers by requiring all future satellites to incorporate hardware for Space Situational Awareness and manoeuvrability.” [Bellamy, D. 2022 Op-Ed: Preparing for Maneuver Warfare in Space – The Next Battleground. Space News (17 August)] A more recent case has also been made for nuclear propulsion to increase the United States, “capabilities to conduct manoeuvre warfare in space … [as their] … satellites … have predictable orbits and limited ability to manoeuvre using chemical propellants.” [Stone, C. 2022 Maneuver Warfare in Space: The Strategic Mandate for Nuclear Propulsion. Mitchell Institute Policy Paper. Volume 33 (January)] Whereas it is claimed potential adversary, “space manoeuvre warfare forces will include vehicles with nuclear thermal and electric propulsion capable of rapidly transferring between orbits to conduct offensive and defensive missions.” [Stone, 2022]

▲ John Frassanito & Associates. 2012 Artist’s Rendering of ‘Copernicus’, a Bimodal Nuclear Thermal Transfer Vehicle in Low Earth Orbit, with Orion Docked. NASA (27 June). This proposed craft is often pictured, along with the General Atomics DRACO in reporting on potential capability that, “could give the United States military an advantage over enemies by making satellites more manoeuvrable and less vulnerable to attack.” [Erwin, E. 2022 Report: Nuclear Propulsion Would Help Military Satellites Maneuver Out of Harm’s Way. Space News (14 January)]

Essentially, “the concept of Dynamic Space Operations, with its emphasis on sustained space manoeuvre, holds significant promise for enhancing the effectiveness of critical United States national security space systems and missions.” [Williams, C. 2024 Dynamic Space Operations: An Overview and Assessment. National Security Space Association Moorman Center for Space Studies (2 April)] The Dynamic Space Operations concept,

“at its core … is an operational concept designed to make an adversary’s job of tracking, targeting, disabling or defeating United States space systems more difficult while enhancing the freedom of action and lethality of U.S. space assets. Dynamic Space Operations involves sustained on-orbit manoeuvring of critical U.S. satellites in peacetime, crisis and conflict in order to maintain initiative, achieve surprise, counter increasingly sophisticated adversary space and counterspace capabilities, and assure timely and effective support to U.S., allied, and friendly terrestrial forces. Chief-of-Space Operations General Saltzman describes it as almost continuous manoeuvring, so that the satellites from any one radar shot looks like it’s manoeuvring and it’s just … constantly changing its orbit as it goes through [Space] – preserving mission but changing its orbit.” [Williams, 2024]

The two ways to sustain space manoeuvre – achieve ‘almost continuous manoeuvring’ by satellites is firstly building capability for, “on-orbit servicing to replace consumables such as fuel as they are depleted.” [Shaw, 2023] The second, or future approach, to achieving sustain space manoeuvre, is development of more, “advanced propulsion technologies” [Shaw, 2023]. The current critique is that satellites are only abled to conduct limited defensive manoeuvres:

“Most satellites can use chemical propellant-powered thrusters to maintain their desired orbit, execute limited manoeuvres like adjusting their position to perform a specific tasking, or deorbit after mission completion. Given the cost and other challenges associated with launching mass into space, satellites typically carry small amounts of chemical propellant. Expending this limited store of propellant to avoid rapidly moving threats would reduce a satellite’s operational lifespan, which would prematurely end its mission life and require an early replacement. A better way to harness the advantages of manoeuvre in space is to develop a more powerful and fuel-efficient means of doing so” [Stone, 2022].

Achieving greater on-orbit manoeuvrability can bolster space mission assurance by enabling defensive operations. This might include fleeing a danger zone; outmanoeuvring adversary Antisatellite Weapons attacks or avoiding adversary Rendezvous and Proximity Operations; thus making United States national security space architectures less vulnerable to attack and thereby increasing their resilience [Williams, 2024].

▲ An X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle [Shanks, A. 2022 The X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle Concludes its Sixth Successful Mission. Photograph. United States Space Force (12 November)]. In 2021, a War on the Rocks Commentary, stated: “The X-37B spacecraft — the first true military spaceplane … What truly sets the X-37B apart is its apparent ability to conduct large changes in its orbit and to do so far more frequently than today’s satellites … The X-37B provides the first hints of the potential of orbital manoeuvre. The spaceplane’s rudimentary ability to conduct more unpredictable and dynamic operations suggests the significant strategic and military advantages of more capable, cheap, and responsive spacecraft.” [Becker, J. 2021 A Starcruiser for Space Force: Thinking Through the Imminent Transformation of Space Power. War on the Rocks (19 May)]

►► Space Delta 9, 5th Space Operations Squadron emblem. The 5th Space Operations Squadron operates the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle.

THE X-37B AS A ROBOTIC SPACE DRONE: The X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle in public reporting is often described as a, “Robotic Space Drone”, which appears to have started around 2018 [Howell, E. 2018 What is a Drone? Space.Com (4 October)]. In the case of NASA’s Ingenuity drone, a small helicopter sent to the surface of Mars, this craft has to fly autonomously in Mars atmosphere because radio signals from Earth take several minutes to arrive on Mars, which precludes live remote piloting from Earth.

▼ Robotic Space Drone Technology Framing and Definitions chart, looks at the notion of a Robotic Space Drone. There are several concepts: (1) Satellite: is an orbital object, placed in Earth Orbit with limited propulsion capability used for station keeping. It has limited piloting control (it follows Mission Control programming). (2) Spaceship: can be Human crewed, or uncrewed, and has greater piloting control, it can follow an orbital path (to conserve fuel), while having greater propulsion capability, and the technology is central to developing Dynamic Space Operations. (3) Robotic: a satellite or spacecraft can have robotic characteristics, where it is fitted with a manipulator function. (4) Drone: the description ‘drone’ characterizes the relationship between the craft and its piloting, which in the Orbital Space context is more likely to be semi-autonomous (Artificial Intelligence component added) due to the need to fill the control gap caused by latency issues encountered between radio signals from Earth arriving (and being received), which precludes live remote piloting from Earth.

In comparison to the United States’ spaceplane force, China has built the following spaceplane force, consisting in the main of the Shenlong spaceplane:

“China has launched three reusable spaceplanes. The 1st was in orbit 2 days, the 2nd over 9 months. The 3rd was launched in December 2023 and remains in orbit. All 3 have released unidentified objects.” [Defense Intelligence Agency. 2022 Challenges to Security in Space; Headquarters Space Force Intelligence. 2024 Space Threat Fact Sheet (16 July)]

GREATER IN-SPACE LOGISTICS AND DELIVERY REFUELLING

A key component of dynamic operations is in-space logistics and delivery refuelling, where there is capacity for refuelling manoeuvring satellites more frequently and actively in orbit.

STEALTHY DEFENCE - ASTRO-SUBTERFUGE

Known as Astro-Subterfuge: “it is foreseeable that Space-Based deception measures will be a core component of military space operations, due to the unique open nature of Space and the predictable physics of Earth’s orbits.” [Rowlands, G. 2019 Astrosubterfuge: Deception & Disguise in the Space Domain. Australian Army Research Centre (16 July)] A potential component of dynamic operations is the stealthy defence of satellites:

“First, if you can’t see it, you can’t hit it. Satellites are already getting smaller too small for most space surveillance networks to detect and track. This trend will likely continue not only as a matter of cost savings, but also as a matter of stealthy defence. Avoiding detection includes manoeuvring satellites to undisclosed wartime orbits.” [Smith, M.V. 2011 Spacepower and Warfare. JFQ. Issue 60. 1st Quarter]

Satellite stealthy defence can either be achieved by using information deception – concealing their whereabouts, or use size to make these too hard to detect (see Concealment), or rely on camouflaging techniques. In the case of information deception approaches to Astro-Subterfuge:

“Convenient cover stories in the open media to protect a vital national security asset. Why wouldn’t you when secrecy in space is paramount?” [Rowlands, 2019]

Potentially, satellites are static objects orbiting Earth in predetermined orbits with known velocities – the Quasi-Positional Siting Theory problem. In addition to manoeuvre, and information deception, components can be designed into satellites that can help these become less visible to the opponent’s Space Surveillance and Tracking [Enayati, A. 2024 The Mechanics of Spaceborne Warfare: Integrating Stealth Technology in Orbital Assets. Genesys Defense and Technologies (June)].

Summary Table of Astrosubterfuge Space Deception Strategies:

RUSSIAN ‘MAYTROSHKA’ NESTING DOLL SATELLITES: “have an outer casing that opens to reveal another, smaller satellite inside with the potential to have weapon systems that can fire at and destroy satellites in orbit” [Gen. James Dickinson, commander of SPACECOM, Aspen Security Forum Panel (19 July); Eckert, C. 2023 Just In: SPACECOM Prepared to Defend U.S. Assets. National Defense Magazine (19 July)]. Russian ‘Maytroshka’ Nesting Doll Satellites, “it’s a satellite in a satellite in a satellite, with a potential weapon system at the very centre of that.” [Dickinson, Eckert, 2023] Russian ‘Maytroshka’ Nesting Doll Satellites capability was displayed in 2019 with launch of Kosmos-2542,

“it released a sub-satellite, Kosmos-2543 which then carried out a series of manoeuvres. Kosmos-2543 is described as an inspector that can examine other satellites and check for damage.” [Hambling, D. 2020 U.S. and U.K. Accuse Russia of In-Orbit Test of Nesting Doll Anti-Satellite Weapon. Forbes (24 July)]

Object-45915 then separated from Kosmos-2543, that the United States, and the United Kingdom’s Space Directorate, Air Vice Marshal Harvey Smyth, described, “as having characteristics of a weapon.” [Hambling, 2020] Object-45915 was identified as likely a weapon:

“because of its fairly high relative velocity … Moving at an estimated relative speed of 200 meters per second /450 miles per hour, the object would smash through the flimsy structure of another satellite. It might also explode before impact like other anti-satellite weapons, scattering shrapnel over a wide area to guarantee a multiple hits on a big target.” [Hambling, 2020]

Russian ‘Maytroshka’ Nesting Doll Satellites, are considered to be a type of camouflaging – deception where the hull of the primary satellite is concealing the nature of the smaller satellite inside it.